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Abstract
This article takes as its starting point the observation that neoliberalism is a concept that
is ‘oft-invoked but ill-defined’. It provides a taxonomy of uses of the term neoliberalism
to include: (1) an all-purpose denunciatory category; (2) ‘the way things are’; (3) an insti-
tutional framework characterizing particular forms of national capitalism, most notably
the Anglo-American ones; (4) a dominant ideology of global capitalism; (5) a form of gov-
ernmentality and hegemony; and (6) a variant within the broad framework of liberalism
as both theory and policy discourse. It is argued that this sprawling set of definitions are
not mutually compatible, and that uses of the term need to be dramatically narrowed from
its current association with anything and everything that a particular author may find
objectionable. In particular, it is argued that the uses of the term by Michel Foucault in his
1978–9 lectures, found in The Birth of Biopolitics, are not particularly compatible with its
more recent status as a variant of dominant ideology or hegemony theories. It instead pro-
poses understanding neoliberalism in terms of historical institutionalism, with Foucault’s
account of historical change complementing Max Weber’s work identifying the distinctive
economic sociology of national capitalisms.
Keywords
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Introduction: The take-off of neoliberalism
There can be little doubt about the take-off in the use of the term neoliberalism. From
being a term that was rarely used prior to the early 1990s, it has become a ubiquitous
concept in critical discourse. Data from the Google ‘culturomics’ app – which undertook
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lexical analysis of the 15 million-plus books that had been scanned into the Google
library in 2012 – identified a nine-fold increase in identification of the word ‘neoliber-
alism’ in its collection between 1990 and 2007 (see Figure 1). This is easily confirmed by
any database search: a keyword search of my own university’s electronic databases drew
me to 28,126 results: articles in question referred to ‘enjoying neoliberalism’ (Dean
2008); ‘burying neoliberalism’ (Andrews 2009); ‘narrating neoliberalism’ (McNeill
2005); ‘magical neoliberalism’ (Fuguet 2001); ‘neoliberalism and literary discourse’
(Costa 2010); ‘neoliberalism, performativity, and research’ (Roberts 2007); ‘queering
Chineseness, unthinking neoliberalism’ (Wong 2008); ‘The Soul of Neoliberalism’
(Moreton 2007); ‘the end of neoliberalism’ (Grantham and Miller 2009), and much
more. The range of academic journals and disciplinary bases from which such articles
appear is also highly eclectic. While neoliberalism as a concept has its origins in
economics, its contemporary influence has extended far and wide across the humanities
and social sciences (cf. Kipnis 2007; Mudge 2008; Boas and Gans-Morse 2009).
It is the inclusiveness and apparent interdisciplinarity of the term neoliberalism that
accounts for part of its appeal. The extent to which it has displaced earlier terms can be
seen from Figure 1 in the relationship of the term to the term ‘monetarism’. As the figure
indicates, monetarism was a widely used term in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly
associated with critiques of the policies of the Thatcher government in the UK and the
Reagan administration in the US. Yet the use of the term declined in the 1990s, and its
decline coincided with the rise of neoliberalism as a common term. One of the difficulties
with a concept such as monetarismwas that, at some level, it does require an understanding
of technical aspects of economic theory (particularly in the relationship it posits
between the money supply and interest rates) that is unlikely to be possessed outside of
the economics discipline. By contrast, a working understanding of what neoliberalism
is seems to have developed in a range of disciplines, with a surprisingly strong degree
of confidence about what the concept means. The term ‘neoliberalism’ has been able to
move easily through the arts and humanities disciplines, in ways that terms grounded more
specifically in economics, such as monetarism, or politics, such as the ‘new right’, cannot.
In this paper, I attempt to give some order and coherence to these many and varied
used of the term neoliberalism. I will begin by noting that much of the usage of the term
Figure 1. Use of the terms ‘monetarism’ and ‘neoliberalism’, 1980–2010 (as measured by Google
Ngram). Source: Google, accessed 9 March 2012.
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is intellectually unsustainable, particularly where it functions as an all-purpose denuncia-
tory category or where it is simply invoked as ‘the way things are’. I will then consider
two more sustainable uses of the term: as a technique of government prevalent in the
Anglo-American economies, and as the currently prevalent form of the dominant ideol-
ogy. I draw attention to debates about dominant ideology theories before considering an
approach derived from the work of Michel Foucault, but which grounds his work more
specifically in a Marxist approach (Marxist-Foucauldians), alongside some more spe-
cific observations on Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics itself (Foucault 2008).
In order to retain any utility, it is argued that uses of the term neoliberalism have to be,
as Mitchell Dean (2010: 1) has noted, ‘circumscribed to a limited range of schools
or forms of thought and . . . practices and policies concerned with the construction of
market and market-like relations’ in the political-economic space. Foucault’s account of
neoliberalism provides an interesting case study of the relationship between ideas and
institutional change, developed along what I would describe as more Weberian than
Marxist lines. It points towards a historical institutionalism that enables important com-
parative analysis of political-economic formations to be undertaken. In using the term in
this way, however, a strong implication is that it needs to be steered away from using it as
a synonym for neo-Marxist hegemony theory, or as the dominant ideology of global
capitalism; if it is simply a synonym of this sort, then it is a term best abandoned as hav-
ing had its intellectual currency devalued through excessive use.
Neoliberalism as an all-purpose denunciatory category
I have observed elsewhere (Flew 2012a) that, despite the warnings of early theorists of
neoliberalism such as Andrew Gamble (2000: 134) to avoid ‘a tendency to reify neo-
liberalism and to treat it as a phenomenon which manifests itself everywhere and in
everything’, this is in fact what has happened to neoliberalism over the last decade.
Donald Nonini has made the observation that ‘the term ‘‘neo-liberal’’ has recently
appeared so frequently, and been applied with such abandon, that it risks being used
to refer to almost any political, economic, social or cultural process associated with con-
temporary capitalism’ (Nonini 2008: 149). My own audit has identified the term being
used to associate neoliberalism with: the rising popularity of Bollywood-style weddings
(Kapur 2009); the prevalence of violence in recent Australian cinema (Stratton 2009);
standardized national educational curricula and national testing (Apple 2004); the rede-
velopment of Dubai (Davis 2007); the performative sexuality of the character of Mr Gar-
rison in the animated comedy series South Park (Gournelos 2009); and the privileging of
access to databases over space for books in Australian public libraries (McQueen 2009).
It is frequently invoked as the larger malevolent force that lies behind the rise of various
reality television programs, including Big Brother (Couldry 2010), MasterChef (Seale
2012) and The Apprentice (McGuigan 2010). It also seems to be particularly associated
with contemporary university management, having been identified as the modus oper-
andi of both the University of California (Butler 2009) and the University of Sydney
(Connell 2011), to take two examples.
This literature is difficult to summarize, as the uses of the term ‘neoliberalism’ are
highly diffuse, but it largely functions here as a rhetorical trope, where the meaning is
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already known to those who would be interested in the topic in question. For example,
Kapur (2009) goes to some lengths to explain the rituals involved in a Bollywood-style
Indian wedding, but at no point is neoliberalism defined or explained in this article, pre-
sumably because both the author and the journal editors could assume that the readers all
basically understood what it meant. A representative example of how the term is used in
this literature can be found in a recent essay by radical educational theorist Henry Giroux:
With the advent of neoliberalism, or what some call free-market fundamentalism, we have
witnessed the production and widespread adoption within educational theory and practice of
what I want to call the politics of economic Darwinism. As a theater of cruelty and mode of
public pedagogy, economic Darwinism undermines most forms of solidarity while promot-
ing the logic of unchecked competition and unbridled individualism. As the welfare state is
dismantled, it is increasingly replaced by the harsh realities of the punishing state as social
problems are increasingly criminalized and social protections are either eliminated or fatally
weakened. (Giroux 2010: 1)
Giroux’s statement is characteristic of the genre, in that any attempt to question core
principles here (‘economic Darwinism’, ‘free-market fundamentalism’, ‘theater of
cruelty’), would leave one exposed to the claim that you are simply endorsing that which
he critiques, and are hence politically compromised. Clearly, one could not subject the
claims made here to any Popperian criteria of falsifiability, meaning that readers of such
work probably know well in advance whether or not they agree with the work in ques-
tion. As a result, and perhaps not surprisingly, those who see a positive economic role for
markets completely reject such arguments, and indeed the terms in which the debate has
been constructed. Mitchell Dean noted that the Institute for Public Affairs, an Australian
pro-market think tank, describes neoliberalism as ‘a leftist version of the secret hand-
shake; a signal that the reader is with fellow travellers’ (Dean 2010: 1).
More ideologically neutral observers, such as Boas and Gans-Morse, observe that the
term has a ‘negative normative valence’, and that ‘neo-liberalism has come to signify a
radical form of market fundamentalism with which no one wants to be associated’ (Boas
and Gans-Morse 2009: 138). Paradoxically, they observe that the denunciatory force
associated with the use of the term neoliberalism is in inverse proportion to the extent
to which it has a shared meaning in the academic literature: ‘the term is effectively used
in different ways, such that its appearance in any given article offers little clue as to what
it actually means’ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 139).
One of the curious features of this generic literature on neoliberalism is that it almost
presumes that political form does not matter. For a literature that puts such an emphasis
upon the politics of knowledge, explicit consideration of formal politics is largely absent
from the discussion. It would appear not to matter, for instance, which political party is in
power in any given country, since all established political parties are presumed to adhere
to the broader project of neoliberalism. This would be consistent with a certain reading of
Marxist political theory, which proposes that all large political parties are constrained by
their commitment to the maintenance of capitalism, but it is rare for the discussion in
much of this work to even go that far. If Giroux’s work is taken as indicative, politics is
associated with the outspoken criticism on the part of public intellectuals rather than any
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tangible engagement with conventional politics or with the institutions of government.
Instead, neoliberalism as a term largely functions here as a ‘conceptual trash heap
capable of accommodating multiple distasteful phenomena without much argument as to
whether one or the other component really belongs’ (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009: 156).
Clive Barnett has observed that this totalizing account of neoliberalism, ‘understood
primarily as an economic doctrine of free markets and individual choice’, results in ‘a
peculiar convergence between the radical academic left and the right-wing interpretation
of liberal thought exemplified by Hayekian conservatism’ (Barnett 2005: 11). It fails to
account for institutional diversity or innovation within governmental practice, instead
remaining within a largely normative terrain about what constitutes the ideal society.
The debate about neoliberalism typically reverts to a first-principles debate about the
pros and cons of liberalism as a political ideology. With the concept of neoliberalism
being ‘oft-invoked but ill-defined’ (Mudge 2008: 703), yet in principle capable of
explaining everything from reality television to university restructuring, there is the
attendant risk of producing what Bruno Latour (2004: 229) terms ‘conspiracy theories’
and Gibson-Graham (2008: 618) refers to as ‘paranoid theorizing’, where there are forces
that are large, dark, relentless and all-encompassing that constitute the underlying source
of explanation of everything.
Neoliberalism as ‘the way things are’
If critics of neoliberalism downplay the significance of political institutions in their
various accounts, those who support greater economic liberalism give them a very
significant role. Public choice theorists have long stressed a range of political factors in
driving up state expenditures, including: interest group activism; ‘pork barreling’ by
vested political interests; the role of political representatives in directing funds to their
own constituencies; bureaucratic empire-building; and institutional entropy in large
departments, where incremental approaches to budgeting create an innate tendency
towards growth rather than cutbacks in the number of activities undertaken (Dunleavy
and O’Leary 1987: 95–117; Dryzek and Dunleavy 2009: 108–19). They also draw
attention to the extent to which such ideas have gained traction, not simply by being
taken up by parties of the political right, but by their influence on the parties of the
centre-left.
Bill Clinton’s declaration to ‘end welfare as we know it’ in the 1990s was a famous
example of this, but perhaps the best known was Labour Prime Minister Jim Callaghan
declaring the end of Keynesianism in Great Britain three years before Margaret
Thatcher came to power. Addressing the 1976 Labour Party Confernece, Callaghan
observed that: ‘We used to think you could spend your way out of a recession and
increase employment by cutting taxes and boosting government spending. I can tell
you in all candour that that option no longer exists’ (quoted in Sassoon 1996: 500).
More recently, Tony Blair’s best-selling autobiography A Journey provides many
statements endorsing what would seem to be a neoliberal political direction. In the
Postscript to A Journey, Blair rejects the claim that the financial meltdown of 2008
proved the failure of the market. Instead, he argued that:
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Big-state politics today will fail. In fact if you offer ‘big state vs. small state’, small will
win. . . . Progressives have to transcend that choice, and offer a concept of the state that
actively empowers people to make their own choices and does not try to do it for them.
(Blair 2010: 686)
Many critics of the ‘New Labour’ project would of course find such an apologia to be
typical of Tony Blair. Keith Tribe has argued that although the neoliberal policy agenda
is discredited, it is ‘now so deeply embedded in the reflexes of the world’s ruling elites
and line managers that they have difficulty conceiving the world in any other way’ (Tribe
2009: 694), and Tony Blair would be taken to be a case in point. But his position is not an
isolated one, as the question of ‘value for money through public services’, and how to
best achieve it in an era of multiple competing claims on state resources, and as global
financial markets set limits to deficit financing at the level of national governments, is
now a common one facing centre-left governments. The Australian social democratic
thinker Hugh Stretton has observed that:
When [markets] work as they should, especially where they work without generating undue
inequalities of wealth and power, Left thinkers should value them as highly as any privatiser
does. Indeed, more highly: the Left has such necessary tasks for government, and so much to
lose from inefficient or oppressive bureaucracy, that it should economise bureaucracy every
way they can. (Stretton 1987: 27)
Neoliberalism as a policy doctrine of the English-speaking world
When Tony Blair refers to ‘the voters’ choosing the ‘small state’ when confronted with
‘big state versus small state’ questions, he is of course referring to British voters. As
Figure 2 indicates, such preferences are very likely country-specific. Voters in countries
Figure 2. Government spending in 13 OECD nations, 1980–2009. Source: Micklethwait (2011).
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such as Austria, Belgium, France, Italy and Sweden have had levels of government
spending exceeding 50 per cent of GDP for a number of years, and in the case of Sweden,
have maintained such levels in spite of significant reductions in the overall size of the
state since the 1980s. By contrast, countries such as the United States, Switzerland
and Japan have stayed consistently below this average. While some countries, such as
Britain, Canada and The Netherlands, showed significant variation in the proportion
of GDP accounted for by government spending over this period, there is at the same time
considerable stability over time among many of the countries, and the overall average
shows a modest level of increase over the period – from 43.8 per cent in 1980 to 47.7
per cent in 2009 – while accommodating wide levels of variation between countries, with
only limited evidence of any convergence toward the mean.1
The noted absence of any ‘optimal’ size for the public sector in capitalist economies
draws attention to the literature on the institutional diversity of capitalist economies. As
Richard Nelson has observed, the fact that so many countries share the core character-
istics of capitalism of being primarily based around a market economy can serve to
obscure the ‘complex and variegated ways that economic activity is actually govern-
ed . . . [which] is both a source and a consequence of considerable political debate about
the appropriate governance of various economic activities and sectors’ (Nelson 2011: 1).
One of the features of studies of the institutional diversity of capitalist societies, or
the ‘varieties of capitalism’ literature (Lane and Wood 2009), is that economic glo-
balization is not leading to policy convergence (Drezner 2001), even in those policy
fields that relate most directly to the activities of multinational corporations (Morgan
2009). This is even before we consider the diverse ways in which political and cultural
forces impact upon market organization, institutional behaviour, and practices of
economic governance, an observation now readily conceded by mainstream econo-
mists through the new institutional economics (North 1990; Williamson 2000). From
this perspective, neoliberalism may be one political ideology of capitalist organization
that co-exists with others. It has been argued, for instance, that neoliberal ideas have
most readily taken root in the English-speaking world and that, for a variety of reasons,
they are less influential in other capitalist societies, such as those of continental Europe
and East Asia (Morgan 2009).
In this respect, then, the critique of neoliberalism may be less an assault on market
society tout court, and be more about a demand that policy-makers in countries such as
the United States, Britain and Australia give more attention to policy ideas developed
elsewhere that have a more collectivist frame of reference. For example, Pusey (2010:
14) has argued that ‘the evidence points . . . to the relative under-performance, based on
conventional economic criteria, of the Anglophone hardline neo-liberal nations when
compared to the social-democratic nations of Western Europe’. There is also an intense
debate about the wider implications of the rise of China and the East Asian economies
for the future of market capitalism (Hutton 2006; Jacques 2009). However, this debate
about neoliberalism as one of a number of competing ideas about the organization of
capitalist economies and societies has been largely overwhelmed by those arguments
that present neoliberalism as the ascendant ideology of global capitalism, so that the
world is seen as being, or becoming, more and more neoliberal in its institutional struc-
tures and policy choices.
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Neoliberalism as the dominant ideology of global capitalism
The strongest definition of neoliberalism comes from Marxist political economy. At its
most straightforward, as presented by Harvey (2005) and others (see Flew 2012b: 47),
neoliberalism is the ideological project of a resurgent political right that gained ascen-
dancy in the United States under Ronald Reagan and in Britain under Margaret Thatcher
in the 1980s, after the crises of the late-Keynesian era in the 1970s. It was able to spread
its influence globally through control over dominant international institutions, such as
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the World Trade Organization:
the term ‘neoliberalism’ itself was popularized by economist JohnWilliamson in his pol-
icy advice to these institutions on the conditions to be attached to financial support for
economic restructuring in developing nations (Steger and Roy 2011: 19–20). In advan-
cing the neoliberal agenda globally, its advocates were aided by the collapse of the com-
munist economies of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in the late 1980s, and by the
‘Third Way’ movement associated with leaders such as Bill Clinton in the US, Tony
Blair in Britain, and Gerhard Schroder in Germany, who sought to move their centre-
left parties in more ‘market friendly’ directions.
Neoliberalism is identified here as a political ideology associated with economic
globalization and the rise of financial capitalism, as Keynesianism was associated with
national capitalism in a monopolistic phase as it evolved from the 1930s to the 1970s,
and classical liberalism with the competitive capitalism of the 19th century (Dume´nil
and Levy 2011; Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn 2012). Harvey defined neoliberalism as ‘a
theory of political economic practices that proposes that human well being can best be
advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an insti-
tutional framework characterized by strong property rights, free markets and free trade’
(Harvey 2005: 2), while Van Apeldoorn and Overbeek describe it as ‘a mix of liberal
pro-market and supply side discourses (laissez-faire, privatization, liberalization, dereg-
ulation, competitiveness) and of monetarist orthodoxy (price stability, balanced budgets,
austerity)’ (Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn 2012: 5). They see the primary driver of neo-
liberal policies as being ‘a political project aimed to restore capitalist class power in the
aftermath of the economic and social crises of the 1970s’ (Overbeek and Van Apeldoorn
2012: 5), and one where, in Harvey’s terms, ‘the role of the state is to create and preserve
an institutional framework appropriate to such [neoliberal] practices’ (Harvey 2005: 2).
Neoliberalism is being viewed here as first and foremost an economic discourse. It is
proposed that the appeal of market-based solutions to economic problems was high-
lighted in the 1970s as state planning and expert-led processes proved to be less able
to address various ‘wicked problems’ of public policy (Rittel and Webber 1973), as new
problems emerged such as simultaneous price inflation and rising underemployment,
which had not been considered possible in Keynesian economic theories. Harvey
observed that this impasse opened up the scope for new economic ideas to gain sway,
which were a complex fusion of theories including monetarism, rational expectations
theories, public choice theory, supply-side economics and the Austrian economic the-
ories of Hayek and Von Mises (cf. Stedman Jones 2012). The common thread linking
such disparate arguments was that ‘government intervention was the problem rather than
the solution, and that a stable monetary policy, plus radical tax cuts in the top brackets,
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would provide a healthier economy by getting the incentives for entrepreneurial activity
aligned correctly’ (Harvey 2005: 54).
Such ideas found a base in leading university economics departments, and were
propagated by various think tanks (e.g. Institute for Economic Affairs and the Adam
Smith Institute in the UK, American Enterprise Institute, Heritage Foundation and others
in the US), as well as in the business media. Such ideas found hospitable political leaders
in Ronald Reagan in the United States and Margaret Thatcher in Britain, but they could
not have gained and held power simply on the basis of their economic doctrines. The
literature on this ‘New Right’ emphasized the ability of these leaders to articulate their
economic ideas to other powerful currents of thought, such as politically conservative
Christianity in the US and opposition to trade union power in Britain; in both cases, a
resurgent nationalism was also identified as an important accompaniment of the rise of
neoliberal political ideologies (Harvey 2005: 85–6, 195–6). The manner in which the
communist states of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe collapsed under the weight of
popular discontent and poor economic performance in the 1980s also gave considerable
sway to arguments that free market capitalism had proven to be a superior political-
economic system to those that had been its alternatives.
The account of neoliberalism developed by Harvey and others is recognizable in
Marxist political economics as a dominant ideology theory. Dominant ideology theories
come in more or less complex variants, from the simple economic determinism found in
Marx’s observation in The German Ideology that ‘the class which is the ruling material
force in society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force’, to the more complex
proposition developed in A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy that ‘the
mode of production of material life conditions the social, political and intellectual life
process in general’ (quoted in Flew 2007: 33–4). Harvey proposes a relationship between
economy and ideology that is relatively simple, whereby a resurgent ruling class was
able to capture the dominant cultural and state institutions and thus impose their ideas to
secure popular consent. He posits that:
Powerful ideological influences circulated through the corporations, the media, and the
numerous institutions that constitute civil society – such as the universities, schools,
churches, and professional associations. The ‘long march’ through these institutions . . . the
capture of certain segments of the media, and the conversion of many intellectuals to
neoliberal ways of thinking, created a climate of opinion in support of neoliberalism as the
exclusive guarantor of freedom. These movements were later consolidated through the
capture of political parties and, ultimately, state power. (Harvey 2005: 40)
Such theories of the dominant ideology have been described by John Thompson as the
‘symbolic glue’ approach, where ‘the dominant ideology provides the symbolic
glue . . .which unifies the social order and binds individuals to it’. Under capitalism, the
dominant ideology functions as ‘a symbolic system which, by incorporating individuals
from all strata into the social order, helps to reproduce a social order which serves the
interests of dominant groups’ (Thompson 1990: 90–1). An associated concept is the
correspondence interpretation of ideas and culture – at any given historical conjuncture,
cultural forms will correspond to dominant political-economic interests, thereby
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securing the power of the dominant groups through what Harvey terms ‘the construction
of consent’.
When presented in this form, the dominant ideology thesis has been open to a range of
critiques. Abercrombie and Turner (1978) questioned whether subordinate classes in
capitalist societies have ever really believed in the ‘dominant ideology’, arguing that in
so far as a dominant ideology has relevance, it is more important in providing a coherent
set of beliefs for dominant groups themselves. Moreover, in a line of thinking going back
to Daniel Bell (1976), sociologists such as Boltanski and Chiapello (2007) have observed
that moral rebelliousness and avant-garde sensibilities can very much co-exist with the
broader pattern of capitalist economic relations.
Given the uncertainty surrounding what ‘society’ can be said to ‘believe’ at any point
in time, one proxy that is sometimes used is the propensity for working-class people to
vote for right-wing political parties, such as the Republican Party in the United States or
the Conservative Party in Britain, whose policy objectives would appear to be at odds
with working-class interests (Harvey 2005: 48–51; Hall 1988). But as Paul Hirst
(1989) argued, this reading of longer-term trends from particular election results is inher-
ently risky. While the parties of the right dominated in many countries in the 1980s, the
1990s saw the Democrats in the US and Labour in the UK make significant electoral
comebacks – the working-class voter who voted for Margaret Thatcher in 1983 and
1987 had by no means made a lifetime commitment to conservative politics. Moreover,
it is far from clear that neoliberalism in its Reagan-Thatcher guise had much lasting
impact outside of the English-speaking world: countries such as France, Germany, Italy
and Japan, to take some examples, did not make policy turns in these directions, and we
have noted earlier that there is no clear and systemic pattern towards reduced govern-
ment expenditures in OECD countries over the latter quarter of the 20th century.
More generally, theories of the dominant ideology through which Harvey and others
understand neoliberalism as providing the intellectual underpinnings of a project to
enhance ruling-class power over states and societies are open to three criticisms. First,
there is the question of functionalism, or the propensity to attribute multiple phenomena,
from reality TV shows to university restructurings to free trade agreements and the con-
duct of monetary policy, to a single causal factor. As Nonini (2008: 150) has argued in
his critique of Harvey’s work as it pertains to China, this runs the risk of producing a
circular argument where ‘flexible capitalism dictates its own conditions of existence
to the political systems of the nation-states it is organized within’. Second, there is the
critique of instrumentalism, or the tendency to see social and political institutions – par-
ticularly those of government – as little more than the ‘empty shells’ that are colonized
by ruling-class interests to pursue their own conscious class strategies. In such accounts,
those within state agencies who are responsible for the design, enacting and implemen-
tation of public policy can appear as ‘simply functionaries who make policy according to
the rational interests of the capitalist class’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 239). Third,
there is the question of whether this becomes a cipher model of the state, wherein the
state becomes essentially ‘a passive mechanism controlled from outside of the formal
political sphere’ (Dunleavy and O’Leary 1987: 327), since public policy is essentially
the outcome of political struggles external to the agencies responsible for it, underpinned
by a coherent political ideology manifesting itself as a policy program (neoliberalism)
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held by ruling-class interests. Critics have argued that such an approach fails to compre-
hend the significance of state institutions as autonomous actors capable of shaping polit-
ical and economic outcomes (Skocpol 2008).
Foucault and Marx: Neoliberalism as hegemony
While some approaches to neoliberalism draw upon an orthodox Marxist political econ-
omy, proposing that it is the economic ideology of global capitalism or a set of false ideas
propagated by economic elites to maintain class power, others have drawn upon the more
complex set of propositions about the relationship between ideas and power derived from
the work of Michel Foucault. In particular, the series of lectures presented by Foucault at
the College de France in 1978–9, published in English under the title of The Birth of
Biopolitics (Foucault 2008), provide a highly nuanced account of the transformation within
liberal thought that has come to be termed neoliberalism. Drawing upon earlier work on
governmentality as a combination of political rationalities of governing and techniques of
governmental practice (Foucault 1991), Foucault identified the rise of neoliberalism in
terms of an intellectual reaction to Keynesian economics and the welfare state on the one
hand, and the priority given to market-enabling and market-conforming economic policies
in post-Second World War Germany on the other. While such ideas, associated with the
German Ordoliberal School of economists and historians, and authors such as Friedrich
von Hayek, were relatively marginal for much of the 1940s and 1950s, they picked up
important adherents in the 1960s and 1970s. Of particular significance was the intellectual
alliance formed with the work being undertaken by the ‘Chicago School’ of economists in
the United States, who proposed a more thorough ‘generalization of the economic form of
the market . . . throughout the social body’ (Foucault 2008: 243), and whose key concepts,
such as human capital theory, monetarism, and the public choice theory of government
action, had gained significant international influence.
My interest here is not in fully elucidating Foucault’s account of neoliberal gov-
ernmentality (see Guala 2006; Gane 2008; Hindess 2009; Tribe 2009; Behrent 2009;
Flew 2012b for such accounts), but rather to consider how it has been deployed in some
recent critical accounts of neoliberalism. Those who have drawn upon Foucault’s work
include Brown (2003, 2006), Dean (2008) and Miller (2010). Brown proposed that ‘part
of what makes neoliberalism ‘‘neo’’ is that it depicts free markets, free trade, and
entrepreneurial rationality as achieved and normative, as promulgated through law
and through social and economic policy’, and that ‘neoliberalism casts the political and
social spheres both as appropriately dominated by market concerns and as themselves
organized by market rationality’ (Brown 2006: 694). Her work associates neoliberalism
with ‘a radically free market: maximized competition and free trade achieved through
economic de-regulation . . . and a range of monetary and social policies favorable to busi-
ness and indifferent toward poverty, social deracination, cultural decimation, long term
resource depletion and environmental destruction’ (Brown 2003: 1). In such an environ-
ment ‘the state itself must construct and construe itself in market terms, as well as
develop policies and promulgate a political culture that figures citizens exhaustively
as rational economic actors in every sphere of life’ (Brown 2006: 694).
Flew 11
Dean drew upon Foucault to argue that neo-liberalism ‘inverts the early [liberal] model
of the state as a limiting, external principle supervising the market to make the market form
itself the regulative principle underlying the state’, thereby ‘reformatting social and polit-
ical life in terms of its ideal of competition within markets’ (Dean 2008: 48, 49). Miller
proposed that Foucault’s work identified that the ‘grand contradiction of neo-liberalism
was its passion for intervention in the name of non-intervention . . . hailing freedom as a
natural basis for life that could only function with the heavy hand of policing by govern-
ment to administer property relations’ (Miller 2010: 56).
Although such accounts do not present neoliberalism as the simple application of
ruling-class power through supportive or compliant governments, they are nonetheless
quite close to conventional Marxist accounts of a dominant ideology. This has led
Barnett (2005) to observe that such accounts present a ‘trouble-free amalgamation of
Foucault’s ideas into the Marxist narrative of ‘‘neoliberalism’’’, which ‘sets up a sim-
plistic image of the world divided between the forces of hegemony and the spirits of
subversion’ (Barnett 2005: 10). For all the apparent newness in invoking Foucault, what
emerges is an understanding of neoliberalism as ‘a coherent ideological project with
clear and unambiguous origins, whose spread is sustained and circulated by an identifi-
able set of institutions’, and which ‘diffuses downwards and outwards from a coherent
set of institutional sites located in the United States and Europe’ (Barnett 2005: 8).
Foucault is invoked in two respects in these accounts of neoliberal hegemony. First,
neoliberalism is presented as a discourse that can ‘shape pictures of reality’ from mul-
tiple institutional sites: as Barnett observes, this is a concept of discourse that is
‘understood instrumentally, as a synonym for ideology’ (Barnett 2005: 9). Second,
neoliberalism is presented as being able to operate not only at the macro level of state
power, but at the micro level of individual subjectivities and everyday routines, where
‘extending the range of activities that are commodified, commercialised and marketised
necessarily implies that subjectivities have to be re-fitted as active consumers, entrepre-
neurial subjects, participants, and so on’ (Barnett 2005: 9). For example, in the large lit-
erature that exists in cultural and media studies on reality television and neoliberalism,
such programs are seen as providing a ‘staging’ of neoliberal social norms that is then –
presumably – ‘learned’ by the viewing subjects, despite the longstanding debates about
whether television has such direct behavioural impact at all (Ruddock 2013).
Foucault on neoliberalism
In spite of the invocation of Foucault in these analyses of neoliberalism as a form of
hegemony, they reproduce three concepts that Foucault himself repeatedly distanced his
own work from: a top-down analysis of power; a state that is able to act on society as a
relatively unified and coherent entity; and a dominant ideology that operates as a
form of social control and as a form of ‘social glue’. There is an extensive literature
on Foucault’s analysis of power (Hoy 1986; Barrett 1991; McHoul and Grace 1993;
Hindess 1996), which observes that: power is productive and not simply repressive;
power is not exercised primarily through domination but rather with the consent of the
governed; and power is not the opposite of freedom. Hindess describes Foucault’s
account of power as being based around the proposition that ‘power is exercised over
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those who are in a position to choose, and it aims to influence what those choices
will be’ (Hindess 1996: 100). In this respect, relations of power are complex, multifa-
ceted and diffuse, and ‘a society without power relations can only be an abstraction’
(Foucault 1982: 208). The significance of this conception of power is apparent when
Foucault’s approach to the state is considered. Contrary to the proposition that the state
is a more-or-less unified entity that can be ‘captured’ by competing political groups,
Foucault’s focus is on government, or the ‘instruments, techniques and procedures that
may be brought to bear on the actions of others’ (Hindess 1996: 100). Government in
its modern, liberal sense becomes a complex and diffuse array of techniques brought to
bear upon free subjects, so that ‘successful government of others . . . depends on the
ability of those others to govern themselves, and it must therefore aim to secure the
conditions under which they are enabled to do so’ (Hindess 1996: 105). Foucault
observed in The Birth of Biopolitics that he avoids a theory of the state in the way one
would ‘avoid an indigestible meal’, since he views ‘the state [as] nothing else but the
mobile effect of a regime of multiple governmentalities’ (Foucault 2008: 77).
The approach to Foucault which reads his account of the rise of neoliberalism as one
of charting the emergence of a new form of dominant ideology is, I would argue, mis-
taken. Even more complex Marxian accounts of the relationship between ideas and state
institutions, such as theories of hegemony, are not consistent with Foucault’s account of
governmentality since, as Tony Bennett has observed, ‘the mechanisms of liberal gov-
ernment do not depend on the production of a generalised form of consent . . . [and] the
state . . . does not possess any general class character or unity’ (Bennett 1998: 75).
As a way of illustrating some of the differences, it is instructive to compare Foucault’s
lectures on neoliberalism, which were presented in Paris in 1977–8, to Stuart Hall’s
essays on ‘Thatcherism’ as a new hegemonic bloc in Britain form the late 1970s onwards
(Hall 1988). First, Hall presents Thatcherism as the outcome of changing ideologies
among sections of the British working class, particularly around law and order, consumer
society and nationalism. By contrast, Foucault’s account of the rise of neoliberalism does
not hinge upon changes in electoral behaviour or popular consciousness at all; rather, it is
consistent with a longstanding series of liberal challenges to state authority that present
the market as a countervailing source of knowledge and moral authority. From the 1940s
onwards, it is challenging not only more ‘statist’ forms of government, but also the
liberal settlement associated with Keynesian economics and the welfare state. Second,
Hall retains a theory of the state that associates the rise of particular government policies
with the interests of certain social classes, whereas Foucault is interested in the changing
techniques of government itself, rather than whose interests government policies and
agencies are alleged to serve. Third, Hall presented the problem for the British left
arising from Thatcherism as one of cultural modernization – how its ideas and institu-
tions could win back those sections of the population that had shifted allegiance towards
the Conservative Party. By contrast, Foucault asks what can the left learn about the
practices of governing from analysis of the rise of neoliberal governmentality. He argues
that, in contrast to liberalism:
What socialism lacks is not so much a theory of the state as a governmental reason, the
definition of what a governmental rationality would be in socialism. That is to say, a
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reasonable and calculable measure of the extent, modes, and objectives of government.
(Foucault 2008: 91–2)
In proposing an alternative reading of Foucault’s The Birth of Biopolitics lectures to
those which essentially assimilate his contribution into Gramscian neo-Marxism, I would
wish to highlight three points (see Flew 2012b for a more detailed analysis).
First, his genealogy of neoliberalism provides a prescient and remarkable contem-
porary analysis of the relationship of ideas to institutional forms and to modes of political
practice. Much of the attention given to this book focuses on the second part, where he
recounts the rise of the Chicago School of neo-classical economists and their relationship
to theorists such as Hayek. This is the neoliberal ‘thought collective’ that has been
widely discussed due to its perceived influence on politics and economics since the
1980s (Mudge 2008; Peck 2008; Mirowski and Plehwe 2009; Dean 2012). But a large
part of Foucault’s lectures are devoted to German Ordoliberalism, which evolved into
the program of the ‘social market economy’, which, by the 1960s, had become an
orthodoxy among the Social Democratic Party as well as the Christian Democratic Party.
German Ordoliberalism retained a bias towards what were termed ‘market-conforming
policies’, but that these co-existed with a diverse range of policy interventions associated
with what was referred to as Vitalpolitik, or a ‘politics of life’, that could include regional
planning, policies to promote private home ownership, initiatives to support small busi-
ness, and environmental management policies. An overarching feature of these was the
use of governmental power to promote decentralization (Foucault 2008: 147–8). The
idea that this form of neoliberalism never saw an active role of government in social pol-
icy is historically inaccurate, and the manner in which it has evolved in Germany bears
little relationship to a pure laissez-faire economic model. There are also fundamental dif-
ferences with Reagan-Thatcher models about the role of institutions such as trade unions
in the setting of economic policy: in the German model, they are seen as partners in cor-
porate governance and macroeconomic policy setting rather than simply as obstacles to
unregulated labour markets. The ‘social market economy’ variant of neoliberalism can
be seen as seeking, as Jamie Peck has observed, ‘an appropriate balance between private
and public power in order to secure economic freedom’, and as involving ‘a search for a
distinctive synthesis, located between the polar opposites of unfettered capitalism and
state control . . . [that] was not just a soggy compromise between the two – a receipt for
the mixed economy’ (Peck 2008: 21, 22).
A second point to be made is that these are the only works of Foucault’s that engage
with the ideas of Max Weber. Foucault’s account of German social thought identifies
Weber as the key figure in shifting debate from the Marxist problematic of the inherent
economic contradictions of capitalism to ‘the problem he introduced into German
sociological, economic and political reflection . . . [which] is not so much the contra-
dictory logic of capital as the problem of the irrational rationality of capitalist society’
(Foucault 2008: 105). This was not to say that capitalism was a crisis-free or self-
managing system at the economic level. Indeed, the divide between the Keynesian lib-
erals and the neoliberals revolved around the question of whether government policies to
address such problems needed to be market correcting or market conforming: the differ-
ing views on how to address the tendency of competition to produce monopolies is a
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classic instance of such debates. But at a broader level, even the well-functioning capi-
talist market economy – whichWeber, unlike Marx, believed could emerge – generates a
range of tensions and contradictions at the social level, particularly in terms of the ‘prin-
ciple of dissociation’ of market relations on civil society, and on ‘the active bonds of
compassion, benevolence, love for one’s fellows, and sense of community’, arising from
a market-based understanding of the social as one which entails ‘picking out the egoist
interest of individuals, emphasizing it, and making it more incisive’ (Foucault 2008:
302). For Foucault, in these lectures at least, Weber’s approach to understanding the ten-
sions in market society, between egoist economic relations through the market on the one
hand, and the broader functioning of civil society on the other, provides a more fruitful
means of grasping the tensions of liberal government than the more traditional Marxist
problematic.2
The appeal of Weber, in this regard, arises from the equal weighting his work gives to
the economic and legal relations of capitalism, as distinct from viewing juridical rela-
tions as ‘being in a relation of pure and simple expression or instrumentality to the
economy’ (Foucault 2008: 162). By rejecting the proposition that economic relations
determine a particular socio-legal order, and hence seeing the legal and institutional
framework as providing the ‘conditions of possibility’ (Foucault 2008: 163) for partic-
ular economic relations to emerge at different moments of historical time, it is possible
to develop a more historically grounded, and less formalistic, account of capitalist eco-
nomic relations:
The economic must be considered as a set of regulated activities from the very
beginning: it is a set of regulated activities with rules of completely different levels,
forms, origins, dates, and chronologies; rules which may comprise a social habitus, a
religious prescription, an ethics, a corporative regulation, and also a law (Foucault
2008: 163).
Third, by making this distinction between an abstract ‘capital’ that exists purely in
thought, and historically and institutionally formed capitalisms that vary over time, and
between states, we can start to see how reforms to institutions and to the legal framework
can reshape economic relations. The paradox that emerges is that, for Foucault, the
neoliberal theorists he considers in The Birth of Biopolitics understood this better than
the Marxists, rather than being the crude dogmatic adherents of free market funda-
mentalism that they are typically portrayed as. By positing the possibility of governing
through the market, as a variant of the historical question of how to engage in governing-
at-a-distance that has long been a feature of liberal thought about government, such
theorists break out of ‘a simple evaluative opposition between individualism and collec-
tivism, the private and the public’ (Barnett 2005: 11).
Neoliberalism provides at least two historical examples of a pragmatics of govern-
ment which involves ‘a coupling of a set of practices and a regime of truth [that] forms an
apparatus (dispositif) of knowledge-power’ (Foucault 2008: 19). By contrast, much of
the recent literature that assimilates Foucault’s work into a neo-Marxist critique of neo-
liberalism as a dominant ideology of global capitalism remains within binary oppositions
of public and private, collective and individual, and state and market. By assuming that
neoliberalism is fundamentally an economic form of government, it ignores Foucault’s
observation that economics can be ‘lateral to the art of governing’, but ‘economic
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science cannot be the science of government, and economics cannot be the internal prin-
ciple, law, rule of conduct, or rationality of government’ (Foucault 2008: 286). As a
result, there is a consistent struggle to identify a different set of policy practices that
could constitute an alternative form of governmentality, and would involve a different
mix of economic and other policy instruments and mechanisms.
Conclusion: Neoliberalism as a historical institutional form
From this overview of different theories of neoliberalism, I would argue that the most
persuasive accounts are those which identify it as a particular form of policy-related doc-
trine, or a combination of ideas about the optimal form of market capitalism combined
with concrete proposals for the reform of institutions that would move particular societ-
ies towards such preferred outcomes. In terms of the matrix of ideas, institutions and
interests (Loisen 2012), such an account sees neoliberalism first and foremost as a series
of ideas about socio-economic order, associated in the first instance with the Austrian
economist Friedrich von Hayek, but also – with important variations – the ‘Chicago
School’ of US political economists, the Ordoliberal thinkers who promoted the ‘social
market economy’ in post-Second World War Germany, and others. As a political philo-
sophy, neoliberalism has been sufficiently practical in its recommendations to constitute
what Michel Foucault terms an ‘art of government’ that serves to shape institutions.
Among those priorities of neoliberalism as a guiding framework for institutions are: the
enterprise form as a model for society as a whole; legal and regulatory frameworks that
promote competition, rather than acting to restrict it in the name of other social goals;
social policy that acts as a support rather than as a corrective to the market economy;
policy actions to promote markets and competition; and judicial activism to limit the dis-
cretionary application of state power (Flew 2012b: 56–7). In so far as particular interests
may benefit from such policies, this is a secondary explanatory factor: the logical coher-
ence of neoliberalism as an intellectual platform for government action exists indepen-
dently of whatever capitalists or other interests may seek to promote it at any particular
point of time.
There are strong intellectual affinities of such an account to what is known as the
historical institutionalist approach in the social sciences. The ‘new institutionalism’ has
been characterized by its attention to institutions as formative middle-range entities that
‘transcend individuals to involve groups . . . in some sort of patterned interactions that are
predictable based upon specified relationships among the actors’ (Peters 1999: 18).
It rejects the free-floating rationally maximizing individual who forms opinions and
makes decisions independently of structural forces, but also critiques the notion that
social structures and their impacts on individual or group behaviour can be known inde-
pendently of their constitutive institutions. Institutionalists are interested in how ‘the
processes of . . . capitalist economic development [are] shaped and mediated by the insti-
tutional structures in and through which these processes take place’ (Martin 2003: 79).
Such a focus upon the methodological middle-range lends itself well to comparative
analysis, as the balance of ideas, interests and institutions will differ from one society
to another. In this respect, historical institutionalists place a distinctive emphasis upon
the path-dependent nature of institutional formations, and the extent to which ‘choices
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made early in the history of any policy, or indeed of any governmental system . . . can
determine subsequent decisions’ (Peters 1999: 19), meaning that ‘institutions are
humanly designed constraints on subsequent human action’ (Sanders 2006: 43).
In the new institutionalism, institutions include formal organizations, but the defi-
nition is considerably broader than simply organizations. For James March and Johan
Olsen, who played a lay role in promoting the new institutionalism in political science,
an institution is
a relatively enduring collection of rules and organised practices, embedded in structures of
meaning and resources that are relatively invariant in the face of turnover of individuals and
relatively resilient to the idiosyncratic preferences and expectations of individuals and
changing external circumstances. (March and Olsen 2006: 3)
From this perspective:
the basic building blocks of institutions are rules, and rules are connected and sustained
through identities, through sense of membership in groups and recognition of roles . . . rules
regulate organizational action [but] that regulation . . . is shaped by constructive inter-
pretations embedded in a history of language, experience, memory, and trust. (March and
Olsen 2006: 8)
Douglass North, who has been a key figure in the new institutional economics and
central to its applications in economic history, defines institutions in a similar way:
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction. They are
made up of formal constraints (rules, laws, constitutions), informal constraints (norms of
behavior, conventions, and self imposed codes of conduct), and their enforcement char-
acteristics. Together they define the incentive structure of societies and specifically
economies. (North 1990: 3)
A key intellectual influence upon such thinking has been the sociology of Max
Weber. In his account of Weber as an economic sociologist, Richard Swedberg identifies
core elements of Weber’s economic sociology of capitalism as being:
First, Weber does not speak of capitalism (in singular), but of capitalisms (in plur-
al) . . . Second, Weber tried to develop a concept of capitalisms centred around social action,
as opposed to seeing capitalism as some kind of system with its own laws, along the lines of
Marx . . . finally, Weber’s typology of capitalisms is deeply historical in nature, with each
type growing out of intense historical research. (Swedberg 2003: 59)
In developing a series of different typologies of capitalism – that included rational
capitalism, political capitalism, and traditional commercial capitalism –Weber signalled
a desire ‘to ground the notion of capitalism in the everyday activities of the economy,
and to get away from the tendency to see capitalism as a system far beyond the individual
actor’ (Swedberg 2003: 60). At the same time, he saw a central role for institutions,
seeing capitalism not as primarily revolving around interactions among individuals, but
rather as one where
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the economic actor orients his/her behaviour not towards other actors but also towards
‘orders’, which consist of prescribed sets of social action that are enforced in different ways.
These orders are sometimes institutions; and the central economic institution is the rational
enterprise, led by an entrepreneur and with a work force that is separated from the means of
production. (Swedberg 2003: 60)
Weber was concerned to emphasize that ‘capitalism must not be seen exclusively as
an economic phenomenon’ (Swedberg 2003: 62), and his own historical work was
careful to explore the interconnectedness between political, legal, cultural and economic
factors in the rise of different institutional forms of capitalism.
At first glance, considering Michel Foucault alongside Max Weber appears odd.
There are those who would view such a reading as erroneously claiming that Foucault
was a ‘proto-neoliberal’, and that such a reading surrenders the possibilities of critique
for the limited horizons of ‘mere administration’ (O’Connor 2012: 402, 403). But as
Gilles Deleuze has observed in his reading of Foucault (Deleuze 1988), there is a theory
of institutions that can be found in Foucault’s work, particularly in relation to that which
is extrinsic to discourse, or the ‘complementary space of non-discursive formations’.
According to Deleuze:
Any institution implies the existence of statements such as a constitution, a charter, con-
tracts, registrations and enrolments. Conversely, statements refer back to an institutional
milieu which is necessary for the formation both of the objects which arise in such examples
of the statement and of the subject who speaks from this position (for example the position
of the writer in society, the position of the doctor in the hospital . . . in any given period,
together with the new emergence of objects). (Deleuze 1988: 9)
As noted above, The Birth of Biopolitics provides one of the few occasions in which
Foucault engaged with Weber. He describes Weber as the person who, in early
20th-century Germany, ‘displaced Marx’s problem’ of the inherent contradictions of
capital as an economic relation with the ‘problem of the irrational rationality of capitalist
society’, and a ‘movement from capital to capitalism, from the logic of contradiction to
the division between the rational and the irrational’ (Foucault 2008: 105). His argument
is that while the analyses of the Frankfurt School have been most influential in academic
work outside Germany, it was the Freiberg School of Ordoliberals who were most influ-
ential within post-war Germany, both intellectually and, importantly, in the generation of
a coherent governmental program and set of institutional arrangements based around the
‘social market economy’.
As the strength of historical institutionalism has been in its attention to the path-
dependent nature of institutional development, and the constraints that this places upon
programs for change, its associated weakness has been in explaining change. As Hall and
Taylor observe, ‘Institutions are seen as relatively persistent features of the historical
landscape and one of the central factors pushing historical development along a series
of ‘‘paths’’’ (Hall and Taylor 1996: 941). It is here that Foucault’s historical genealogy
of neoliberal thought from the 1930s to the 1970s is interesting, in that it identifies the
historical development of such a program for institutional change.
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While Hayek and others were of course critics of Marxism and socialist economic
doctrines, in practice they directed far more critical attention to other liberals, and
particularly programs associated with Keynesian economics, the welfare state and
partnerships between employers and trade unions. The ‘Road to Serfdom’ that Hayek
referred to was less about the threat of Bolshevism than it was about the corrosion of
liberalism through a well-intentioned collectivist impulse. Foucault establishes that the
‘liberal art of government’, which had been developing in Europe from the 18th century
onwards, faced a continual challenge in how to reconcile individual interests and collec-
tive interest, or freedom and security:
Liberalism, the liberal art of government, is forced to determine the precise extent to which
and up to what point individual interests . . . constitute a danger to the interests of all. The
problem of security is the protection of the collective interest against individual interests.
Conversely, individual interests have to be protected against everything that could be seen
as an encroachment of the collective interest. (Foucault 2008: 65)
Once we see neoliberalism as a project for institutional change grounded in particular
ideas about the social and the nature of liberal government, and not simply as an
expression of the zeitgeist of global capitalism or as a conspiracy of ruling elites, there is
the scope to assess the extent to which it has been adopted in practice, and why it took
root in some places and not in others. Foucault discusses why very different historical
conceptions of the state meant that neoliberal ideas found fertile ground in the United
States, but far less so in France: for Germany, it is the experience of war, and the dis-
crediting of previously hegemonic statist and nationalist policy discourses, that provides
the opportunity space for the Ordoliberal program to be adopted. Of course, the case
study that is missing here, and which would have been fascinating, is that of Britain,
where the early contours of the Thatcher revolution, and how it differed from traditional
British conservatism, were only starting to be revealed.
Clarification of the distinctive elements of a neoliberal institutional and policy pro-
gram, and parameters through which one can assess whether or not it has been adopted in
the context of particular national capitalisms, would also enable a clearer picture to
emerge as to whether it continues to have significance, or whether its influence may have
peaked in the 1980s and early 1990s. Categories such as ‘postneoliberalism’ (Peck et al.
2010), ‘zombie neoliberalism’ (Peck 2010), and ‘neoliberalism 3.0’ (Aalbers 2013) run
the risk not only of sounding like gimmicks, and further amplifying the conceptual
vagueness that has long surrounded the term, pointing again to the critique made by
Mitchell Dean that ‘the term should no longer be used to characterise all aspects of state
governing in contemporary liberal democracies and the majority world beyond them’
(Dean 2012: 1). I have suggested that thinking about neoliberalism as a project of
institutional transformation in the face of path-dependent national capitalisms, as can be
developed out of historical institutionalism and the innovative linking of Foucault and
Weber proposed here, minimizes the risk of the term becoming a kind of conceptual
trash-can, into which anything and everything can be dumped, as long as it is done so
with suitable moral vehemence. This may require rescuing ‘neoliberalism’ as an aca-
demic concept from the most vocal critics of its underlying morality.
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Notes
1. A wide range of factors can affect these shares over and above the policy decisions of gov-
ernments. Involvement in wars will generally see the government share of GDP increase, as in
the US over the 2000s, as did the bail-out of financial institutions in both the US and Britain
over 2008–9. More generally, positive terms of trade tend to reduce the government share of
GDP (by increasing the net wealth of the private sector), while government spending as a per-
centage of GDP tends to negatively correlate with trends in the business cycle, decreasing dur-
ing the upswing (while taxation revenues increase), and increasing during the downswing (as
taxation revenues decrease).
2. The relationship between the work of Max Weber and that of Michel Foucault is discussed in
O’Neill (1986), Steiner (2008), Colliot-The´le`ne (2009), and Jimine´z-Anca (2013).
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